"x x x.
The point of inquiry is whether the respondents have the right to evict the petitioners from the subject property and this should be resolved in the respondents’ favor. Between the petitioners’ unsubstantiated self-serving claim that their father inherited the contested portion of Lot No. 3517 and the respondents’ Torrens title, the latter must prevail. The respondents’ title over such area is evidence of their ownership thereof. That a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession thereof[16] are fundamental principles observed in this jurisdiction. Alternatively put, the respondents’ title and that of their predecessors-in-interest give rise to the reasonable presumption that the petitioners have no right over the subject area and that their stay therein was merely tolerated. The petitioners failed to overcome this presumption, being inadequately armed by a narration that yearns for proof and corroboration. The petitioners harped that the subject area was their father’s share in his parents’ estate but the absence of any evidence that such property was indeed adjudicated to their father impresses that their claim of ownership is nothing but a mere afterthought. In fact, Lot No. 3517 was already registered in Maria’s name when Jose Sr. built the house where the petitioners are now presently residing. It is rather specious that Jose Sr. chose inaction despite Maria’s failure to cause the registration of the subject area in his name and would be contented with a bungalow that is erected on a property that is supposedly his but registered in another’s name. That there is allegedly an unwritten agreement between Maria and Virginia that Jose Sr.’s and the petitioners’ possession of the subject area would remain undisturbed was never proven, hence, cannot be the basis for their claim of ownership. Rather than proving that Jose Sr. and the petitioners have a right over the disputed portion of Lot No. 3517, their possession uncoupled with affirmative action to question the titles of Maria and the respondents show that the latter merely tolerated their stay.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to the possession of the property involved. The avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community.[17] The said objectives can only be achieved by according the proceedings a summary nature. However, its being summary poses a limitation on the nature of issues that can be determined and fully ventilated. It is for this reason that the proceedings are concentrated on the issue on possession. Thus, whether the petitioners have a better right to the contested area and whether fraud attended the issuance of Maria’s title over Lot No. 3517 are issues that are outside the jurisdiction and competence of a trial court in actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry. This is in addition to the long-standing rule that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which an ejectment proceeding, is not an exception.
In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion,[18] a similar allegation – possession of the property in dispute since time immemorial – was met with rebuke as such possession, for whatever length of time, cannot prevail over a Torrens title, the validity of which is presumed and immune to any collateral attack.
In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns the property on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12892, which was “issued in the name of Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L. Songco.” It is a settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. Hence, as the registered owner of the subject property, respondent is preferred to possess it.
The validity of respondent’s certificate of title cannot be attacked by petitioner in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not petitioner has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.[19] (Citations omitted)
In Salandanan,[20] the prohibition against the collateral attack of a Torrens title was reiterated:
In Malison, the Court emphasized that when [a] property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner’s title to the property is presumed and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. In this particular action where petitioner’s alleged ownership cannot be established, coupled with the presumption that respondents’ title to the property is legal, then the lower courts are correct in ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to possession of the subject premises.[21] (Citation omitted)
Given the foregoing, the petitioners’ attempt to remain in possession by casting a cloud on the respondents’ title cannot prosper.
Neither will the sheer lapse of time legitimize the petitioners’ refusal to vacate the subject area or bar the respondents from gaining possession thereof. As ruled in Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.,[22] laches does not operate to deprive the registered owner of a parcel of land of his right to recover possession thereof:
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code, in relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529).
x x x x
Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by arguing that FETA as well as its predecessor[-]in[-]interest, Don Dionisio M. Fabella, are guilty of laches and should, therefore, be already precluded from asserting their right as against them, invoking, in this regard, the rulings of this Court to the effect that while a registered land may not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of the registered owner’s inaction and neglect, his right to recover the possession thereof may have been converted into a stale demand.
While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners’ posture, a closer look at our jurisprudence negates their submission.
To start with, the lower court found that petitioners’ possession of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In this connection, Bishop vs. Court of Appeals teaches that if the claimant’s possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latter’s right to recover possession is never barred by laches.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners’ occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.[23] (Citations omitted)
It is, in fact, the petitioners who are guilty of laches. Petitioners, who claimed that Maria fraudulently registered the subject area inherited by their father, did not lift a finger to question the validity of OCT No. 543, which was issued in 1929. Petitioners waited for the lapse of a substantial period of time and if not for the respondents’ demands to vacate, they would not have bothered to assert their father’s supposed successional rights. The petitioners’ inaction is contrary to the posture taken by a reasonably diligent person whose rights have supposedly been trampled upon and the pretense of ignorance does not provide justification or refuge. Maria was able to register Lot No. 3517 in her name as early as 1929 and respondents acquired title in April 5, 1968 and knowledge of these events is imputed to the petitioners by the fact of registration.
x x x."
