"x x x.
The December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution was issued in accordance with Section 12(c), in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70, dated July 3, 2000, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if he finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to require consideration.
In dismissing MERALCO’s petition for review of the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, the Secretary of Justice ruled that after carefully examining the petition and its attachments, no error on the part of the handling prosecutor was found to have been committed which would warrant a reversal of the challenged resolution. Thus, the December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution concluded that the challenged resolution was in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter.
MERALCO considers the December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution invalid because of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which it is based, as required under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 14, Chapter III, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. MERALCO claims that the requirement to state the facts and the law in a decision is a mandatory requirement and the DOJ is not exempt from complying with the same.
In arguing as it did, MERALCO failed to note that Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution refers to “courts,” thereby excluding the DOJ Secretary and prosecutors who are not members of the Judiciary. In Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio,[10] we ruled that “Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution does not x x x extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.” In explaining the inapplicability of Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution to DOJ resolutions, the Court said that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding.
This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,[11] where we pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court.[12] “[This] is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice [reviews] the former's order[s] or resolutions” on determination of probable cause.[13]
In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers. Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents.[14] This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties.[15] Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which sets a public prosecutor apart from the court.
The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented to him, he should take further action by filing a criminal complaint in court. In doing so, he does not adjudicate upon the rights, obligations or liabilities of the parties before him. Since the power exercised by the public prosecutor in this instance is merely investigative or inquisitorial, it is subject to a different standard in terms of stating the facts and the law in its determinations. This is also true in the case of the DOJ Secretary exercising her review powers over decisions of public prosecutors. Thus, it is sufficient that in denying a petition for review of a resolution of a prosecutor, the DOJ resolution state the law upon which it is based.
We rule, therefore, that the DOJ resolution satisfactorily complied with constitutional and legal requirements when it stated its legal basis for denying MERALCO’s petition for review which is Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if he finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ resolution noted that MERALCO failed to submit a legible true copy of the confirmation of sale dated May 30, 2000 and considered the omission in violation of Section 5[16] of Department Circular No. 70. MERALCO assails the dismissal on this ground as an overly technical application of the rules and claims that it frustrated the ends of substantial justice. We note, however, that the failure to attach the document was not the sole reason of the DOJ’s denial of MERALCO’s petition for review. As mentioned, the DOJ resolution dismissed the petition primarily because the prosecutor’s resolution is in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter.
At this point, it becomes unnecessary to decide the legality of Section 7 of DOJ Department Circular No. 70 allowing the outright dismissal of MERALCO’s petition for review. It is basic that this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.[17]
Also, DOJ Department Circular No. 70 is an enactment of an executive department of the government and is designed for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice; before it was enacted, it is presumed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional.[18] Lest we be misunderstood, we do not hereby evade our duty; in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, we merely accord respect to the basic constitutional principle of separation of powers, which has long guided our system of government.
x x x."
